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Abstract
A multi-economy Schumpeterian growth model is constructed. Re-
gions are interdependent through technology transfer. Households can
stay as workers or become researchers at some cost. Workers are em-
ployed in production and researchers in R&D. Workers are unionized
and union power depends on the government’s protection. The main
findings are as follows. If international technological dependence in-
creases, then the workers’ wages, the growth rate and the level of
welfare fall. The international coordination of labour market policy
raises the workers’ wages and promotes growth and welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the role of labour unions in a number of economies which
benefit from each other’s technological knowledge. The basic questions are
as follows. To what extent should a single economy support or suppress its
labour unions? Should labour market policy be internationally coordinated
or should the economies compete with each other by such policy?
Labour unions and employer federations have two roles which are often
mixed in economic debates: (i) they bargain over wages and (ii) lobby the
government for a number of issues (e.g. pension schemes, hiring and firing
costs, restrictions on hours of work). To avoid confusion in this matter, this
study concentrates wholly on role (i) and assumes that labour unions and
employer federations try to increase their income through wage settlement.
Political lobbying is ignored here and the author considers it elsewhere.1
The microfoundations of labour market policy are as follows. When the
labour union and the employer federation alternate in making offers to each
other, they behave so as to maximize a weighed geometric average of their
utilities.2 The weights of such an average, which reflect the relative bargain-
ing power of the parties, depend on government regulations (e.g. restrictions
in starting a dispute, the intermediation of disputes). On the other hand,
the employer’s reference income in wage bargaining hinges on how many of
the workers will participate in a strike.3 The number of non-striking workers,
too, depends on government regulations.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), Aghion and Howitt (1998),
and Wa¨lde (1999) examine economic growth from the viewpoint of creative
destruction in which firms can step forward in the quality ladders of tech-
nology by R&D. We take a similar ’Schumpeterian’ approach, but instead
of a competitive labour market we assume wage bargaining. The parties in
bargaining observe the effect of wages on both employment and investment.
Expensive labour may give rise to a higher growth rate. Cahuc and Michel
(1996) (using an OLG model) and Agell and Lommerud (1997) (using an
1Using a common agency framework, Palokangas (2003) considers unions and employers
as lobbies trying to influence the self-interested government.
2Cf. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) or Palokangas (2000), Chapter 1.
3In the limit case where all workers will take part in a strike, the results are the same
as in the case of a monopoly union whose relative bargaining power is unity.
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extensive game model) show that a minimum wage may create an incentive
for workers to accumulate human capital. Palokangas (1996, 2000) introduces
wage bargaining into Romer’s (1990) product-variety model with skilled and
unskilled workers. He obtains that higher union bargaining power raises
wages for unskilled workers, decreases production, lowers wages for skilled
workers, decreases R&D costs and boosts economic growth. All these models,
however, ignore the uncertainty that is embodied in technological change. To
eliminate this shortcoming, we use here a model of creative destruction.
Because it is difficult to measure union power, there is still very little
empirical evidence on the effects of union power on R&D and economic
growth.4 Some papers explain R&D by the unionization rate, i.e. the ratio
of unionized to all workers,5 but this is a different issue.6
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional
background of the model. Final-good, intermediate-good and research firms
are modelled in section 3 and households in section 4. Section 5 examines
wage bargaining. Finally, section 6 considers governments in two cases: either
they play Nash or cooperate in labour market policy.
2 The setting
There is a fixed number J of economies that are interdependent through
technology transfer. Each economy j contains a fixed number of similar
4Beitnes and Søraas (2003) present some indirect support to a positive dependence of
R&D on union power. They show that the end of deunionization in South Korea in 1987
increased sharply real wages, R&D and the accumulation of total factor productivity.
5Addison and Wagner (1994) find a positive cross-sectional correlation, but Menezes-
Filho et.al. (1998) find little correlation in a panel of firms, between R&D and the union-
ization rate in the UK. On the other hand, Connolly et.al. (1986), Hirsch (1990), (1992),
Bronars et.al. (1994) find a negative cross-sectional correlation between these in the USA,
and Betts et.al. (2001) in Canada. Hence, the results are highly institution-specific.
6The unionization rate is not a proper proxy for union power in wage bargaining. In
many European countries it tells nothing about union power, because the contract made by
the representative union is extended to cover all employers and employees in the industry.
In some other countries (e.g. USA, Canada), unions can make agreements only for their
members and a unionized worker can be easily replaced by a non-unionized worker. This
imposes an additional constraint for the union in wage bargaining, but does not necessarily
affect the relative bargaining power of the parties.
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households.7 All households are modelled as dynastic families which are risk
averters and share identical preferences. The members of such a family can
be either workers, who are employed in production, or researchers, who are
employed in R&D. Family-optimization considerations determine the evolu-
tion of consumption expenditure over time, the allocation of savings across
shares in different firms, and the decision whether a family member becomes
a researcher or enters the labour force as a worker. A single family takes
prices, wages, profits, employment and aggregate labour supply as given.
Research firms can adopt ideas from other firms everywhere in the world.
A single firm’s technology is a random variable but the probability of its
improvement in one unit of time is an increasing function of both its and the
other firms’ R&D. To focus on this technological transfer as the main con-
nection between economies, we assume that there is no international trade
in goods or factors and each intermediate product is specific to the economy
in which it is used and produced.8 In such a case, the price levels of the
economies are independent and we can choose a separate numeraire for each
economy. Technological change in each economy is characterized by a sepa-
rate stochastic process and the growth rates can differ across the economies.
The structure of single economy j can be characterized as follows:
(i) Competitive firms produce the final good from the intermediate good
according to decreasing returns to scale.
(ii) One monopolist at a time produces the intermediate good by workers.
Several firms do R&D by using researchers and finance their expendi-
ture by issuing shares. As soon as any of these completes a new inno-
vation, it takes over the whole production of the intermediate good and
drives the old producer out of the market. Innovations are non-drastic,
i.e. the previous incumbent could make a positive profit if the current
one charged the monopoly price.9 Hence, the current incumbent sets
the maximum price that gives the previous one non-positive profits.
7The purpose of this admittedly strong assumption is to allow us to make welfare
comparisons, which would be extremely problematic with heterogeneous households.
8Howitt (2000) makes the same assumption for the same reason.
9If innovations were drastic, the intermediate-good producer would not be constrained
by potential competition from other producers. This would complicate the analysis.
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(iii) The households decide on their labour supply before entering the labour
market. They save in shares in research firms of their own economies.
(iv) The workers are unionized. The labour union can control the whole of
the intermediate good industry, including potential entrants, so that
the change of the incumbent producer does not affect the union’s bar-
gaining position. There is, however, a fixed number βj of (employed
or unemployed) workers who shall not or cannot take part in strikes.
In wage bargaining, the labour union maximizes the discounted value
of the flow of the workers’ wages and the employer federation the dis-
counted value of the flow of the employers’ profits.10 Government reg-
ulations influence both the relative bargaining power of the parties
(which we denote αj) and the number βj of non-striking workers.
(v) Direct subsidy to R&D is commonly non-feasible.11 Given this, the
government regulates union power as a second-best policy.
The growth model is based on a Poisson process. We focus entirely on
the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is
invariable across technologies, and ignore the behaviour of the system during
the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. If the initial state
is chosen outside a stationary equilibrium, then the model would most likely
generate cycles, which are technically extremely difficult to cope with.
10Some papers assume that the expected wage outside the firm is the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) state (pp. 177, 185-6) that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
11It is commonly suggested that in order to eliminate the externality due to R&D, the
government should directly subsidize R&D. In reality, however, R&D is mostly carried
out by research departments of companies that are also producing other goods, so that
the government cannot completely distinguish between inputs being used in R&D and
production. If R&D were subsidized, then it were in the interests of both employers and
labour unions to hide costs of production under R&D expenditure and share the subsidy.
For this discussion, see Palokangas (2000), chapter 8.
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3 Firms
(a) Producers in the high-tech sector. The representative final-good firm in
economy j makes output yj from intermediate input nj through technology
yj = Bjf(nj), f
′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, (1)
where Bj is the productivity parameter. It maximizes profit Πj
.
= Pjyj−pjnj
by intermediate input nj, taking the input price pj and the output price Pj
as fixed. This implies the equilibrium price and the equilibrium profit as
pj = PjBjf
′(nj), Πj = PjBj[f(nj)− njf ′(nj)]. (2)
One unit of intermediate good is produced from one unit of workers’
labour, but each new generation of the good provides constant  > 1 times
as many services as the product of the generation before it. There is one firm
at a time as the incumbent producer, who maximizes its profit
pij
.
= pjnj − wjnj (3)
by its input nj, given the demand function pj in (2). Without potential
competition from other firms, the first-order condition ∂pij/∂nj = 0 yields
the monopoly price pmj = wj/[1+njf
′′(nj)/f ′(nj)]. The previous incumbent,
whose productivity is 1/ times the productivity of the current incumbent,
makes a positive profit pij = (1/)pjnj − wjnj > 0 for prices pj > wj. To
make innovations non-drastic, pmj > wj, we assume
njf
′′(nj)/f ′(nj) < 1/− 1.
The producer then sets pj = wj to prevent the others from entering the
market. We normalize the value of the high-tech good, Pjyj, at unity for all
economies j. Given this,  > 1, pj = wj, (1), (2) and (3), we obtain
Pjyj = 1, PjBj =
1
f(nj)
, wj =
pj

=
f ′(nj)
f(nj)
, Πj = 1− nj f
′(nj)
f(nj)
,
wjnj = x(nj)
.
=
njf
′(nj)
f(nj)
, pij = (− 1)x(nj), wjnj + pij +Πj = 1. (4)
(b) Research firms. Because only researchers are used in R&D, investment
expenditure in economy j is equal to labour cost vjlj, where lj is the re-
searchers’ labour input and vj their wage. When a research firm in economy
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j is successful, it uses its new technology to drive the old producer out and
starts producing good j itself. Its profits are then distributed among those
who had financed it. When R&D is not successful for a firm, there is no
profit and the ex post value of a share of the firm is zero.
Region j is subject to technological change which is characterized by a
Poisson process qj as follows. During a short time interval dθ, there is an
innovation dqj = 1 with probability Λjdθ, and no innovation dqj = 0 with
probability 1−Λjdθ, where Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the research
process. We assume that the arrival rate Λj depends on research input both
in the economy j, lj, and elsewhere, l−j as follows:
Λj = λzj(lj, l−j, µ) with zj(lj, l−j, µ)
.
= l1−µj l
µ
−j, l−j
.
=
1
J − 1
∑
k 6=j
lk,
0 < µ < 1, ∂zj/∂µ = 0 and ∂
2zj/(∂lj∂µ) = −1 < 0 for lj = l−j, (5)
where λ and µ are positive constants. The higher parameter µ is, the more
the economies are technologically dependent on each other.
We denote the serial number of technology in economy j by tj. Because
the invention of a new technology raises tj by one and the level of productivity
by  > 1, the level of productivity corresponding to technology tj is given by
B
tj
j = B
0
j 
tj . (6)
The average growth rate of the level of productivity Bj in the stationary state
is in fixed proportion λ log  to zj.
12 Hence, research inputs zj
.
= l1−µj l
µ
−j can
be used as proxies of the growth rates in economies j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
4 Households
Households (a) decide their occupation as workers or reseachers on the basis
of prospective income, and (b) determine the flow of consumption and savings
given the flow of income. These choices are determined as follows.
(a) Labour supply. Because each family can change its members’ occupation
from a worker to an researcher at some cost and the abilities of all individuals
12For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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in economy j differ, there is a decreasing and convex transformation function
between the supply of workers, Nj, and the supply of researchers, Lj, as:
Nj = N(Lj), N
′ < 0, N ′′ < 0. (7)
More and more workers must be transformed in order to create one more
research input. A worker’s expected wage is equal to the wage wj times the
likelihood of employment, nj/Nj:
wej
.
= (nj/Nj)wj, (8)
Because researchers are not unionized, they are always fully employed lj = Lj
and their expected wage is equal to the wage vj.
Because households must choose their combination (Lj, Nj) of labour sup-
ply before entering the labour market, this choice is based on the transfor-
mation function (7) and the expected wages (vj, w
e
j) which the household
takes as given. This equilibrium is found by maximizing expected income
vjLj +w
e
jNj = vjLj +w
e
jN(Lj) by Lj, which yields the first order condition
vj/w
e
j = −N ′(Lj). This condition, lj = Lj, (7) and (8) yield
− N
′(lj)
N(lj)
= − N
′(Lj)
N(Lj)
=
vj
wejNj
=
vj
wjnj
. (9)
(b) Saving. Region j contains a fixed number κj of similar households which
consist of both workers and researchers.13 The utility for household ` ∈
{1, ..., κj} in economy j from an infinite stream of consumption beginning at
time τ takes the form
Uj(Cj`, τ) = E
∫ ∞
τ
Cσj`e
−ρ(θ−τ)dθ with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (10)
where θ is time, E the expectation operator, Cj` consumption, ρ the rate of
time preference and 1/(1− σ) is the constant rate of relative risk aversion.
When household ` has financed a successful R&D project, it acquires the
right to a certain share of profits the successful firm earns in the production
of final goods. Since the old producer is driven out of the market, all shares
held in it lose their value. Let sj` be the true profit share of household `
when the uncertainty of the outcome of the projects are taken into account.
13See footnote 7.
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Following Wa¨lde (1999), we assume that the change in this share, dsj`, is a
function of the increment dqj of a Poisson process qj as follows:
dsj` = (ij` − sj`)dqj with ij` .= Sj`/(vjlj), (11)
where Sj` is saving by household ` in economy j. When a household does
not invest in the upcoming vintage, its share holdings are reduced to zero in
the case of research success dqj = 1. If it invests, then the amount of share
holdings depends on its relative investment in the vintage.
Labour income in economy j, Ij, is equal to wages paid in production,
wjnj, and in R&D, vjlj,
Ij
.
= vjlj + wjnj. (12)
The total income of household ` ∈ {1, ..., κj} in economy j, Aj`, consists of
an equal share 1/κj of labour income Ij and the profit of the final-good firm,
Πj, and the share sj` of the total profits of the intermediate-good firm, pij,
Aj`
.
= (Ij +Πj)/κj + sjpij = [vjlj + wjnj +Πj]/κj + sj`pij. (13)
The budget constraint of household ` in economy j is given by
Aj` = PjCj` + Sj`, (14)
where Cj` is consumption, Sj` saving and Pj the consumption price.
(c) Optimization. We denote the value of receiving a share sj` of the profits
of the monopolists using current technology tj by Ω(sj`, tj), and the value of
receiving a share ij` of the profits of the monopolists of the next generation
by Ω(ij`, tj +1). Household ` maximizes its utility (10) subject to stochastic
process (11) and the budget constraint (14) by its saving Sj`, given labour
income Ij, profits Πj and pij, total investment expenditure vjlj and aggregate
research input zj. This maximization leads to the Bellman equation
14
ρΩ(sj`, tj) = max
Sj`
{
Cσj` + Λj[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)]
}
, (15)
where Cj` = (Aj`−Sj`)/Pj and Λj = λzj. The first order condition associated
with the Bellman equation (15) is given by
λzj
d
dSj`
[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)] = σCσ−1j` /Pj. (16)
14Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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We try the solution that consumption expenditure PjCj` is a share
0 ≤ 1/hj` ≤ 1 out of income Aj`, and the value function is of the form
Ω = (Aj`/hj`)
σ/rj`, where the income-consumption ratio hj` and the (subjec-
tive) interest rate rj` are independent of income Aj`. Inserting that solution
into (15) and (16), we obtain the following results for economy j (Appendix
A). First, every innovation that replaces technology tj by tj + 1 raises con-
sumption yj and decreases the consumption price Pj in economy j as follows:
P
tj
j /P
tj+1
j = y
tj+1
j /y
tj
j =  > 1. (17)
Second, the interest rate rj and R&D costs in economy j, vjlj, are given by
15
rj` = rj
.
= ρ+ (1− σ)λzj, vjlj = ζj
(
x(nj), zj
)
,
∂
∂x
(ζj
x
)
< 0,
∂ζj
∂zj
> 0.
(18)
5 Employment and wage bargaining
From (4), (9) and (18) it follows that
−ljN
′(lj)
N(lj)
=
vjlj
wjnj
=
ζj
(
x(nj), zj
)
x(nj)
. (19)
Given (7) and (18), this equation defines the function
nj(lj, zj), ∂nj/∂lj < 0 ⇔ ∂nj/∂zj > 0 ⇔ x′ > 0. (20)
In each economy j, the workers’ wage wj is determined by bargaining
between a union representing workers in economy j and a federation repre-
senting employers of these workers. We assume, for simplicity, that these
both are risk neutral and have the same rate of time preference % > 0. The
union controls the whole of the intermediate-good industry inclusive of the
possible entrants, but there is a fixed number βj of workers who cannot go
on strike or who are willing to work even during strikes. This means that
the reference income is zero for the union and pij|nj=βj for the federation.16
The union attempts then to maximize the expected value Uj of the stream of
15Note that this definition of the interest rate rj contains also the expected growth of
consumption through technological change (6).
16See footnote 10.
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workers’ real wages wjnj/Pj, while the federation attempts to maximize the
expected value Fj of the stream of employers’ real profits over the reference
income, [pij − pij|nj=βj ]/Pj.17 Given the result (17) and the stochastic tech-
nological progress (see part (b) in section 3), these targets take the form:18
Uj(lj, l−j, µ) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%θ
wjnj
Pj
dθ =
wjnj
P 0j [%+ (1− )λzj]
,
Fj(lj, l−j, µ) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%θ
pij − pij|nj=βj
Pj
dθ =
pij − pij|nj=βj
P 0j [%+ (1− )λzj]
. (21)
The union (federation) maximizes its welfare Uj (Fj) by workers’ wage
wj, taking the supply of research work elsewhere, l−j, as given. Because there
is one-to-one correspondence from wj to lj through (20), wj can be replaced
by lj as the instrument of bargaining. The outcome of bargaining is then ob-
tained through maximizing the Generalized Nash Product Uαjj F1−αjj , where
constant αj ∈ [0, 1] is relative union bargaining power (hereafter shortly
’union power’), by lj, taking l−j as given. This yields (Appendix B):
lj(l−j, αj, βj, µ), ∂lj/∂αj > 0, ∂lj/∂βj < 0 ⇔ x′(βj) > 0,
[∂lj/∂µ]lj=l−j < 0, x
′[dnj/dlj] < 0, lim
αj→1
lj = lim
βj→0
lj. (22)
Results (22) can then be rephrased as:
Proposition 1 Given the research work elsewhere, l−j, lower union power
(i.e. a smaller αj) or higher technological dependence on other economies
(i.e. a higher µ) slows down R&D and growth in economy j.
With higher union power, workers’ wage wj increases, but their employment
lj and expected wage w
e
j falls. With a lower relative expected wage for a
worker, more households choose to become researchers rather than workers.
A higher number of researchers promotes R&D and economic growth. When
technological change in an economy depends more on foreign R&D and less
on domestic R&D (i.e. if µ increases), an equal decrease in workers’ expected
wage yields a smaller increase in the growth rate. Because the union has
then less incentives to decrease workers’ current income and to boost growth
through higher wage claims, the equilibrium growth rate must be lower.
17Because workers and shareholders spend their income in consumption, their nominal
income must be divided by the consumption price Pj .
18For this, see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61.
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6 The governments
The symmetry across the households in economy j yields Cj` = yj/κj. Given
(1), (6), (7), (17), (20) and (22), we can define
Cj` = yj/κj = f(nj)Bj/κj = B
0
j f
(
nj(lj, zj)
)
tj/κj
.
= c(lj, zj)
tj ,
∂c/∂lj < 0 ⇔ ∂c/∂zj > 0 ⇔ x′ > 0, (dc/dlj)x′ < 0. (23)
The utility function (10) takes then the form
Uj = E
∫ ∞
τ
c(lj, zj)
σσte−ρ(θ−τ)dθ. (24)
The government in economy j maximizes social welfare (24) by union
power αj, given the number of researchers elsewhere, l−j.19 Because lj de-
pends positively on αj (see (22)), union power αj can be replaced by the
number of researchers, lj, as the instrument of maximization. Denoting the
value of the state of technology tj for this government by Υj(tj), and noting
(5) and (22), we obtain the Bellman equation for this policy as follows:
ρΥj(tj) = max
lj
Bj, where
Bj .= c
(
lj, zj(lj, l−j, µ)
)σ
σt + λzj(lj, l−j, µ)[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)]. (25)
Noting (5), we obtain the first-order condition corresponding to (25) as:
∂Bj
∂lj
= σcσ−1σt
[ ∂c
∂lj
+
∂c
∂zj
∂zj
∂lj
]
+ λ[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)]∂zj
∂lj
= 0. (26)
We try the solution that the value function is of the form Υj(tj) = ϑc
σσt,
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. This
solution yields the following proposition (Appendix C):
Proposition 2 If the local governments are rational and can influence union
power (through either αj or βj), then technological dependence on other
economies (i.e. a higher µ) decreases workers’ wage wj, the growth rate
lj = l(µ) and the level of welfare, Bj = B, in all economies j, dwj/dµ < 0,
dl/dµ < 0 and dB/dµ < 0.
19The ’more symmetric’ assumption that the government takes union power elsewhere,
αk for k 6= j, as given, leads to a more complicated model. It is also more natural to think
that the government takes the observable variable l−j rather than unobservable variables
αk for k 6= j as given.
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When labour market policy is coordinated across economies 1, ..., J , the gov-
ernments behave as if there were only one government in the world and µ→ 0
holds. According to proposition 2, coordination µ→ 0 increases union power.
Hence, the following corollary is established:
Proposition 3 The coordination of labour market policy, µ → 0, increases
workers’ wages, the growth rate and the level of welfare.
Propositions 2 and 3 are explained in the final section.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines a world with the following properties. First, growth
is generated by creative destruction. A firm creating the latest technol-
ogy through a successful R&D project crowds the other firms with older
technologies out of the market so that they lose their value. Second, there
is a world-wide externality in technological knowledge. Third, the house-
holds save by buying shares in R&D projects. Fourth, the households decide
whether their members are researchers who are used in R&D or workers
who are employed in production. A change of occupation involves a cost.
Fifth, direct subsidy to R&D is commonly non-feasible. Sixth, wages are
determined by bargaining. The main findings are as follows.
Union power has a positive impact on economic growth, but not necessar-
ily on welfare. With higher union power, workers’ wages increase, but their
employment and expected wage falls, and more households choose to be-
come researchers rather than workers. With a larger number of researchers,
there will be more innovations and a higher growth rate. When technological
change in an economy depends more on technology spillovers from abroad
and less on domestic R&D, an equal decrease in workers’ expected wage
yields a smaller increase in the growth rate. In such a case, labour unions
have less incentives to decrease workers’ current income and to boost growth
through higher wage claims, so that the equilibrium growth rate is lower.
If governments can influence union power, international technological de-
pendence tend to slow down economic growth. There is a trade-off between
high current consumption and a high growth rate. If technological change
depends less on domestic and more on foreign R&D, then an equal decrease
12
in consumption produces a smaller increase in the growth rate. This makes a
rational government to transfer resources from R&D to consumption through
a decrease in union power and the growth rate falls. Once the externality due
to technological dependence is internalized by uniform labour market policy,
welfare and the growth rate increase.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
dynamic model is used to explain the relationship of growth, wage bargaining
and public policy, the following judgement nevertheless seems to be justified.
It is known that globalization increases international technological depen-
dence. Without international cooperation, this change will decrease workers’
wages, the growth rate and the level of welfare. Either labour unions reduce
their wage claims or governments weaken labour unions in their jurisdiction.
Appendix A
Let us denote variables depending on technology tj by superscript tj.
Since according to (13) income A
tj
j` depends directly on the share s
tj
j`, we
denote A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`). Guessing that hj` is invariant across technologies, we obtain
P
tj
j C
tj
j` = A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`)/hj`, S
tj
j` = (1− 1/hj`)Atjj`(stjj`). (27)
The share in the next producer tj + 1 is determined by investment under
technology tj, s
tj+1
j` = i
tj
j`. The value functions are then given by
Ω(s
tj
j`, tj) = (C
tj
j`)
σ/rj`, Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1) = (C
tj+1
j` )
σ/rj`. (28)
Given this, we obtain
∂Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)/∂S
tj
j` = 0. (29)
From (11), (13), (27) and (28) it follows that
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
=
1
v
tj
j l
tj
j
,
∂[A
tj+1
j` (i
tj
j`)]
∂i
tj
j`
=
∂[A
tj+1
j` (s
tj+1
j` )]
∂s
tj+1
j`
= pi
tj+1
j ,
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
=
σ
rj`
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1 ∂C
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
= σ
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pitj+1j
rj`hj`P
tj+1
j v
tj
j l
tj
j
.
(30)
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We focus on a stationary equilibrium where the allocation of labour,
(l
tj
j ,m
tj
j , n
tj
j , n
tj
j ) and a household’s expenditure share, C
tj
j`/y
tj
j , are invariant
across technologies. Given (4), (5), (7), (9), (13) and (27), this implies
l
tj
j = lj, n
tj
j = nj, z
tj
j = zj, w
tj
j = wj, Nj = N(Lj) = N(lj), pi
tj
j = pij,
Π
tj
j = Πj, P
tj
j y
tj
j = 1, v
tj
j = vj, A
tj
j` = Aj`, S
tj
j` = Sj`. (31)
From (1), (6) and (31) it then follows that
P
tj
j /P
tj+1
j = y
tj+1
j /y
tj
j = C
tj+1
j` /C
tj
j` = B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j =  > 1. (32)
Inserting (27), (28) and (32) into equation (15), we obtain
0 = (ρ+ Λj)Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)− (Ctjj`)σ − ΛjΩ(itjj`, tj + 1)
= (ρ+ Λj)(C
tj
j`)
σ/rj` − (Ctjj`)σ − Λj(Ctj+1j` )σ/rj
= (C
tj
j`)
σ[ρ+ Λj − rj` − σΛj]/rj` = (Ctjj`)σ[ρ− rj` + (1− σ)λzj]/rj`.
This leads to the function
rj = rj` = ρ+ (1− σ)λzj. (33)
Inserting (4), (5) and (29)-(33) into (16) yields
0 = Λj
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
− σ (C
tj
j`)
σ−1
P
tj
j
= λzjσ
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pij
rjhj`P
tj+1
j vjlj
− σ (C
tj
j`)
σ−1
P
tj
j
= σ
(C
tj
j`)
σ−1
hj`P
tj
j
[
λzj
σpij
rjvjlj
− hj`
]
and
hj` = hj
.
= λzj
σpij
rjvjlj
=
(− 1)λσx(nj)zj
vjlj[ρ+ (1− σ)λzj] . (34)
Given
∑κj
`=1 i
tj
j` = 1, (4), (11), (13), (27) and (34), we obtain vjlj =
∑κj
`=1 Sj`,
hjvjlj
hj − 1 =
hj
hj − 1
κj∑
`=1
Sj` =
κj∑
`=1
hj`
hj` − 1Sj` =
κj∑
`=1
Aj` = vjlj + wjnj +Πj + pij
= vjlj + wjnj +Πj + pij = vjlj + 1
14
and
vjlj = hj − 1. (35)
Noting (33), (34) and (35), we obtain
(hj − 1)hj = vjljhj = (− 1)λ
σx(nj)zj
ρ+ (1− σ)λzj =
(− 1)λσx(nj)
ρ/zj + (1− σ)λ,
which defines the function
hj
(
x(nj), zj
)
,
∂hj
∂x
=
1
x(nj)
( 1
hj − 1 +
1
hj
)−1
,
∂hj
∂zj
> 0.
Inserting this into (35) produces vjlj = ζj
(
x(nj), zj
) .
= hj
(
x(nj), zj
)−1 with
∂ζj
∂zj
> 0,
1
ζj
∂ζj
∂x
=
1
(hj − 1)x
( 1
hj − 1 +
1
hj
)−1
<
1
x
and
∂
∂x
(ζj
x
)
=
1
x
∂ζj
∂x
− ζj
x2
=
ζj
x
( 1
ζj
∂ζj
∂x
− 1
x
)
< 0.
Appendix B
Given (4), (5), (19), (20) and (21), the logarithm of the Generalized Nash
product Uαj F1−αj takes the form
Γj(lj, l−j, αj, βj, µ)
.
= αj log Uj + (1− αj) log Fj
= αj log(wjnj) + (1− αj) log
(
pij − pij|nj=βj
)− logP 0j − log[%+ (1− )λzj]
= (1− αj) log
[
1− x(βj)/x(nj(lj, zj))
]
+ log x(nj(lj, zj))− log P 0j
− log[%+ (1− )λzj] + (1− αj) log(− 1)
with zj = l
1−µ
j l
µ
−j and %+ (1− )λzj > 0. (36)
Because a logarithm is an increasing transformation, the outcome of bar-
gaining is obtained through maximizing the function (36) by lj, taking l−j
as given. This leads to the first-order condition
∂Γj
∂lj
=
[
(1− αj)x(βj)/x(nj)
1− x(βj)/x(nj) + 1
]
x′(nj)
x(nj)
dnj
dlj
+
(− 1)λ
%+ (1− )λzj
∂zj
∂lj
= 0.
(37)
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Note that if all workers are controlled by the union and can take part in a
strike, βj → 0, then x(βj) → 0 by (4), and we obtain the same outcome as
in the case of a monopoly union, α→ 1.
In equilibrium, there must be pij > pij|nj=βj and nj > βj. This and (4)
yield x(nj) > x(βj). Noting this,  > 1 and (5), we obtain from (37) that
x′(nj)
x(nj)
dnj
dlj
=
[
(1− αj)x(βj)/x(nj)
1− x(βj)/x(nj) + 1
]−1
(1− )λ
%+ (1− )λzj
∂zj
∂lj
< 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂αj
= − x(βj)/x(nj)
1− x(βj)/x(nj)
x′(nj)
x(nj)
dnj
dlj
> 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂βj
=
(1− αj)x′(βj)x(nj)
[x(nj)− x(βj)]2
x′(nj)
x(nj)
dnj
dlj
< 0 ⇔ x′(βj) > 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂µ
∣∣∣∣
lj=l−j
=
(− 1)λ
%+ (1− )λzj
∂2zj
∂lj∂µ
∣∣∣∣
lj=l−j
< 0.
Given this and the second-order condition ∂2Γj/∂l
2
j < 0, the comparative
statics of the equation (37) produce the function lj(l−j, αj, µ) with
∂lj
∂αj
= −∂
2Γj
∂l2j
/
∂2Γj
∂lj∂αj
> 0,
∂lj
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
lj=l−j
= −
[
∂2Γj
∂lj∂µ
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
]
lj=l−j
< 0.
Appendix C
From Υj(tj + 1) > Υj(tj), (4), (5), (22), (23) and (26) it follows that
dc
dlj
=
∂c
∂lj
+
∂c
∂zj
∂zj
∂lj
= c1−σ−σt
λ
σ
[Υj(tj)−Υj(tj + 1)]∂zj
∂lj
< 0, x′ > 0,
dnj
dlj
< 0,
dwj
dlj
= wj
(f ′′
f ′
− f
′
f
)dnj
dlj
> 0,
∂c
∂lj
< 0,
∂c
∂zj
> 0. (38)
For a large class of production functions f(nj) in (1) – e.g. CES functions
with a fixed factor of production – it is true that x′(βj) > 0 holds if and
only if x′(nj) > 0. This, (22) and (38) yield ∂lj/∂βj < 0. In such a case,
a decrease in the number of non-striking workers, βj, has the same effect as
an increase in union power αj: they both support unions in bargaining and
increase the amount of research work, lj, and the growth rate. Consequently,
αj and βj are complements as government instruments.
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Inserting the value functions Υj(tj) = ϑc
σσt and Υj(tj + 1)/Υj(tj) = 
σ
into the Bellman equation (25) and noting (18) produce
0 = cσσt + (σ − 1)Υj(tj)λzj − ρΥj(tj)
= Υj(tj)
[
1/ϑ− ρ− (1− σ)λzj
]
= Υj(tj)
[
1/ϑ− rj
]
and ϑ = 1/rj > 0. Given ϑ = 1/rj > 0, (5), (26), Υj(tj) = ϑc
σσt and
Υj(tj + 1)/Υj(tj) = 
σ, we obtain
1
Υj(tj)
∂Bj
∂lj
=
σcσ−1σt
Υj(tj)
[
∂c
∂lj
+
∂c
∂zj
∂zj
∂lj
]
+ λ
[
Υj(tj + 1)
Υj(tj)
− 1
]
∂zj
∂lj
=
σ
cϑ
[
∂c
∂lj
+
∂c
∂zj
∂zj
∂lj
]
+ λ(σ − 1)∂zj
∂lj
=
σ
cϑ
∂c
∂lj
+
[
σ
cϑ
∂c
∂zj
+ λ(σ − 1)
]
∂zj
∂lj
=
σrj
c
∂c
∂lj
+ (1− µ)
[
σrj
c
∂c
∂zj
+ λ(σ − 1)
]( l−j
lj
)µ
= 0. (39)
Given (5), (18) and (23), the functions c, rj, ∂c/∂zj and ∂c/∂lj are indepen-
dent of µ for lj = l−j. This, (5), (38) and (39) yield
∂2Bj
∂lj∂µ
∣∣∣∣
lj=l−j
= λ(1− σ)− σrj
c
∂c
∂zj
=
σrj
(1− µ)c
∂c
∂lj
< 0. (40)
Differentiating the first-order condition (39) and noting (40) and the second-
order condition ∂2Bj/∂l2j < 0, we obtain the functions
lj = Θ(l−j, µ),
∂Θ
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
lj=l−j
= −
[
∂2Bj
∂lj∂µ
/
∂2Bj
∂l2
]
lj=l−j
< 0. (41)
Given the functions (41), we define a system of equations
Aj = lj −Θ(l−j, µ) = 0 (j = 1, ..., J), (42)
with endogenous variables l1, ..., lJ . Differentiating this system, we obtain the
coefficient matrix
(
∂Aj/∂lk
)
J×J . The reaction function of economy j is given
by (42). The sufficient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium require
that the coefficient matrix
(
∂Aj/∂lk
)
J×J is subject to diagonal dominance.
20
20See footnote ??.
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Noting (5), (41) and (42), this dominance can be rephrased as:
0 <
∂Aj
∂lj
±
∑
k 6=j
∂Aj
∂lk
= 1± ∂Θ
∂l−j
∑
k 6=j
∂l−j
∂lk
= 1± ∂Θ
∂l−j
.
This implies ∂Θ/∂l−j < 1. With symmetry lj = l for all j, we can transform
relations (41) into l = Θ(l, µ). Differentiating this equation totally and noting
(41), we obtain lj = l(µ) with dl/dµ = (∂Θ/∂µ)/[1− ∂Θ/∂l−j] < 0.
Inserting lk = l(µ) for all k into (25) and (26), and noting (5) yield
B = c(l(µ), l(µ))σσt + λl[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)],
σcσ−1σt[∂c/∂lj + (1− µ)∂c/∂zj] + (1− µ)λ[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)] = 0.
The effect of µ on Bj = B is then given by
dB/dµ =
{
σcσ−1σt[∂c/∂lj + ∂c/∂zj] + λ[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)]
}
dl/dµ
=
{
σcσ−1σtµ ∂c/∂zj + µλ[Υj(tj + 1)−Υj(tj)]
}
dl/dµ < 0.
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